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Gambling is a widespread recreational activity and requires pitting the values of poten-
tial wins and losses against their probability of occurrence. Neuropsychological research
showed that betting behavior on laboratory gambling tasks is highly sensitive to focal
lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and insula. In the current study,
we assessed the neural basis of betting choices in healthy participants, using functional
magnetic resonance imaging of the Roulette Betting Task. In half of the trials, participants
actively chose their bets; in the other half, the computer dictated the bet size. Our results
highlight the impact of volitional choice upon gambling-related brain activity: Neural activ-
ity in a distributed network – including key structures of the reward circuitry (midbrain,
striatum) – was higher during active compared to computer-dictated bet selection. In line
with neuropsychological data, the anterior insula and vmPFC were more activated during
self-directed bet selection, and responses in these areas were differentially modulated by
the odds of winning in the two choice conditions. In addition, responses in the vmPFC
and ventral striatum were modulated by the bet size. Convergent with electrophysiological
research in macaques, our results further implicate the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) in the
processing of the likelihood of potential outcomes: Neural responses in the IPC bilaterally
reﬂected the probability of winning during bet selection. Moreover, the IPC was particu-
larly sensitive to the odds of winning in the active-choice condition, when the processing of
this information was required to guide bet selection. Our results indicate an important role
of the IPC in human decision-making under risk and help to integrate neuropsychological
data of risk-taking following vmPFC and insula damage with models of choice derived from
human neuroimaging and monkey electrophysiology.
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INTRODUCTION
Gambling is a common recreational activity in which a bet, typi-
cally a sumof money, is placedon anuncertainprospect.Gambling
can be seen as a form of decision-making under risk and requires
pitting the subjective values of potential wins and losses against
their probability of occurrence. Abnormal betting on laboratory
gambling tasks has been observed in a number of psychiatric dis-
orders that are characterized by impairments in everyday decision-
making, such as addictions (Lawrence et al., 2009), bipolar disor-
der (Murphy et al., 2001; Roiser et al., 2009), and schizophrenia
(Hutton et al., 2002). Neuropsychological research using the Cam-
bridge Gamble Task (CGT) has further shown that laboratory
betting behavior is highly sensitive to focal brain injury. Patients
with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) show
increased overall betting (Mavaddat et al., 2000;Manes et al., 2002;
Clark et al., 2003, 2008), while a group of patients with insula
damage were impaired in adjusting their bets to the chances of
winning (Clark et al., 2008). These results indicate that the anterior
insula and the vmPFC are critically involved in betting decisions.
In healthy participants, previous neuroimaging studies revealed
that the vmPFC and anterior insula, among other structures, are
activated during valuation of risky response options (e.g., Chib
et al., 2009) and during anticipation of uncertain outcomes (for
reviews, see Ernst and Paulus, 2005; Krain et al., 2006; Knutson
and Greer, 2008; Liu et al., 2011). While the results of these studies
on valuation are compatible with the aforementioned neuropsy-
chological work, the neural responses to bet selection as the most
direct analog of gambling-related choice in healthy humans have
rarely been studied. In the current study, we administered the
Roulette Betting Task (Studer and Clark, 2011), in which partici-
pants are asked to place bets on risky gambles with varying chances
of winning, to healthy volunteers and assessed the neural responses
during bet selection by use of functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI).
Our ﬁrst aim was to investigate differences in neural responses
during active and passive selection of bets. Research on real-life
gambling has highlighted a key inﬂuence of active choice upon
risk-taking behavior. Even in games of pure chance, gamblers pre-
fer situations that allow direct choice or manual control, and place
higher bets under such conditions, a phenomenon termed the
“illusion of control”(Langer, 1975; Ladouceur andMayrand, 1987;
Davis et al., 2000).Wehave recently shown that the requirement for
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active choice boosts selection-related psychophysiological arousal
during laboratory gambling (Studer and Clark, 2011). Further-
more, prior fMRI studies revealed that neural responses to the
presentation of wins and losses in the striatum are enhanced
under conditions of instrumental choice (Coricelli et al., 2005;
Rao et al., 2008; Camille et al., 2011). In contrast, the inﬂuence
of the requirement for active choice upon neural activity at the
time of selection remains largely unstudied. In the current study,
we compared neural responses during active (i.e., volitional, self-
directed) versus computer-dictated selection of the bet amount.
We hypothesized that neural activity during the selection phase in
the brain reward circuitry, speciﬁcally in the striatum, would be
higher in the active-choice condition.
Our second goal was to assess how the chances of winning are
represented in the brain during the selection of bets. We reasoned
that areas guiding risk-sensitive choice would be more responsive
to the chances of winning during active compared to passive bet
selection. Previous fMRI research assessing neural activity during
outcome anticipation consistently found that neural responses in
the anterior insula and vmPFC are modulated by the likelihood
of potential outcomes (Critchley et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2005;
Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008; Yacubian et al., 2006; Tobler et al.,
2007; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). The neural representation of
the chances of winning during the selection phase, i.e., during the
decision process per se, is less clear. A small number of previous
fMRI studies indicate that, in addition to the anterior insula and
vmPFC, the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) reﬂects the probability
of potential outcomes during the choice window (Huettel et al.,
2005;VanLeijenhorst et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2009). In close paral-
lel, electrophysiological research in non-human primates reported
that ﬁring rates of neurons in the posterior parietal cortex co-vary
with the reward likelihood during response selection (Shadlen
et al., 1996; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Shadlen and Newsome,
2001; McCoy and Platt, 2005; Kable and Glimcher, 2009). Thus,
we hypothesized that neural activity in the IPC, anterior insula,
and vmPFC would reﬂect the likelihood of winning during bet
selection, particularly in the active-choice condition.
Our design also allowed the investigation of brain responses
modulated by bet size. Previous fMRI studies found that the stria-
tum and medial OFC are sensitive to the magnitude (and expected
value) of potential rewards during outcome anticipation (Knut-
son et al., 2001, 2005; Yacubian et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007;
Tom et al., 2007). Based on these results, we hypothesized that the
striatum and the vmPFC would be sensitive to the bet size during
the selection phase.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Right-handed male healthy volunteers (n = 41) took part in this
study (mean age= 24 years, SD= 4) and attended a single MRI
session following a screening appointment. Volunteers were pre-
screened to exclude MRI contraindications, regular use of drugs,
regular gambling, and prior history of neurological or psychiatric
illness. The study was approved by the national research ethics
committee and was conducted in accordance with the Declara-
tion of Helsinki. All participants gave written informed consent,
and were reimbursed £40 for participation plus a variable bonus
depending on their ﬁnal score in the task, which participants were
told would range between £0 and £10 (in reality, all participants
received bonuses between £5 and £8). In the MRI session, partic-
ipants received the task instructions and 10 practice trials before
entering the scanner. Light head restraints were used to limit
participant’s head movement during MRI data acquisition. Two
participants were excluded from analysis; one due to technical
problems with the MRI scanner, the other due to problems with
the normalization of MRI data.
TASK
Participants were administered the Roulette Betting Task (Studer
and Clark, 2011), a computerized task that assesses risk-sensitive
decision-making. The task was programmed in Visual Basic 2008
(Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA, USA). Participants viewed the
computer monitor through a mirror ﬁtted on top of the head coil
and used a MRI-compatible button box to make their choices.
Participants completed three runs of the task; each run consisted
of 25 trials and lasted about 10 min. Each trial consisted of three
phases: selection, anticipation, and feedback (see Figure 1). At
the beginning of each trial, a ﬁxation cross was displayed for a
variable inter-trial interval, drawn from an exponential distrib-
ution ranging from 4 to 10 s. Subsequently, a wheel with 10 red
and blue segments was presented, along with three bets. Partici-
pants were instructed that if the wheel stopped on a blue segment,
they would win, and if the wheel stopped on a red segment, they
would lose. The ratio of blue (winning) and red (losing) segments
varied across trials, reﬂecting the chances of winning (60, 70, or
80%). The presentation of the wheel initiated the selection phase:
participants were asked to choose one of the three presented bet
boxes by pressing a corresponding key on the button box. Two trial
types were contrasted: “active-choice” trials, in which the partici-
pants were required to select the size of bet (10, 50, or 90 points),
and “no-choice” trials, in which all three bets boxes contained
identical amounts. Once a response had been made, the corre-
sponding bet box stayed highlighted until the end of the selection
period (ﬁxed duration= 3.5 s). The wheel then spun (anticipation
period), with a variable duration drawn from an exponential dis-
tribution ranging from 4 to 8 s. The wheel stopped on one of the
10 segments, initiating the feedback period. If the wheel stopped
on a blue segment, the chosen amount of points was won, and
the outcome message “YOU WON [XX] POINTS” was presented.
If the wheel stopped on red, the selected amount of points was
lost, and the message “YOU LOST [XX] POINTS” appeared. The
accumulated point score was presented to participants at the end
of each run.
DATA ACQUISITION AND PREPROCESSING
Gradient echo T2∗-weighted echo-planar images (EPIs) were
acquired on a Siemens Tim Trio 3 Tesla magnet using a 32 slice
axial oblique sequence, with a repetition time of 2 s (TE 30 ms,
ﬂip angle 78˚, voxel size 3.0 mm× 3.0 mm× 3.0 mm, matrix size
64× 64, ﬁeld of view 192 mm× 192 mm, bandwidth 2442 Hz). In
order to reduce signal dropout in the orbitofrontal cortex, the
plane of acquisition was individually tailored for each partici-
pant by aligning it with the base of brain (approximately 0˚ to
−10˚ to the anterior commissure – posterior commissure line).
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FIGURE 1 | Roulette BettingTask. Each trial consisted of three phases: (1)
Selection, in which the participant chose one of three bet boxes, (2)
Anticipation, in which the wheel was spun, (3) Feedback, in which the
decision outcome was presented. “Active-choice trials” and “no-choice trials”
were identical, except that in active-choice trials participants were presented
with three different bet options, while in no-choice trials all three bet boxes
contained identical amounts. The green box was added to this graph for
illustration purposes only.
At the start of each of the three sessions, six dummy volumes
were discarded to allow for equilibrium effects. Each run lasted a
maximum of 360 repetitions (12 min), but was terminated early
on block completion. In addition, a high-resolution T1-weighted
structural image was collected for each participant.
Processing and analysis of fMRI data was performed using
SPM5 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Data preprocessing consisted
of within-subject spatial realignment, spatial normalization, and
spatial smoothing using an isometric Gaussian kernel with a full
width at half-maximum of 10 mm. Volumes were normalized to
the International Consortium for Brain Mapping (ICBM) tem-
plates that approximate to Talairach and Tournoux (1988) space,
using a matrix obtained from normalizing each subject’s seg-
mented structural scan onto the ICBM gray and white matter
templates.
DATA ANALYSIS
For analysis of behavioral responses, the following two measure-
ments were assessed for each trial: (a) response time, (b) selected
bet amount (in active-choice trials only). Statistical analysis of
behavioral data was conducted in SPSS (Version 15.0; SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL, USA). All statistical tests are reported two-tailed, and
alpha was set at 0.05.
We assessed event-related BOLD responses modeled to the
selection and outcome phases of each trial, using a canonical
hemodynamic response function implemented within a general
linear model (GLM). Four event types were distinguished: active-
choice trials and no-choice trials were modeled at selection onset
using epoch functions with individual response times as the dura-
tions, and wins and losses were modeled at outcome with a dura-
tion length of 2 s. The probability of winning and the bet size
were added as parametric modulators onto the active-choice and
no-choice selection regressors. Thus, a total of four parametric
modulators were added to the GLM. The use of these decision
variables as parametric modulators allows for the identiﬁcation of
brain areas in which the magnitude of BOLD responses correlates
with the probability of winning and the bet size on a trial-by-trial
basis. The design matrix hence comprised 8 columns [3 (selection:
active choice)+ 3 (selection: no choice)+ 2 (feedback)], plus the
6 movement parameters from spatial realignment as covariates of
no interest.
Twelve subjects uniformly selected the highest bet option in
all active-choice trials. The lack of any variation in the bet
size in active-choice trials made the calculation of the paramet-
ric modulator impossible for these subjects; hence they were
excluded from further analysis. The remaining 27 participants
included in the ﬁnal analysis selected a bet other than their
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most frequently chosen one in 7–58% of active-choice trials
(Mean= 34%, SD= 13%).
Next, we calculated the following ﬁrst-level single-subject
contrasts for the selection phase:
(1) Active-choice versus no-choice trials.
(2) Parametric modulation by probability of winning during
active-choice and no-choice trials.
(3) Parametric modulation by probability during active-choice
minus parametricmodulation by probability duringno-choice
trials.
(4) Parametric modulation by bet size during active-choice and
during no-choice trials.
(5) Parametric modulation by bet size during active-choice minus
parametric modulation by bet size during no-choice trials.
In the speciﬁed GLM, any shared variance between the two
parametric modulators (probability of winning and bet size) is
assigned to the probabilitymodulator (enteredﬁrst) through auto-
orthogonalization implemented in SPM. We chose this ordering
of modulators in this primary GLM as it gives maximal explana-
tory power to the probability modulator (see Hare et al., 2008;
Symmonds et al., 2010). As the chances of winning and the size of
chosen bets were correlated in the active-choice trials in most sub-
jects, we conducted a follow-up analysis in order to test whether
the regions associatedwith the likelihoodof winningwereuniquely
sensitive to the probability independent of bet size. Thus, a sec-
ond GLM was calculated, in which the order of modulators was
reversed (bet size entered ﬁrst). The activations identiﬁed in the
contrasts (2) and (3) in the primary GLM were then compared
with the results obtained in the same contrasts in this secondGLM.
The individual contrast images were taken to a second-level
group analysis. One sample t -tests were calculated on the single-
subject contrast images. We ﬁrst computed region-of-interest
(ROI) analyses based on a priori hypotheses about the involve-
ment of four brain regions in risky selection as discussed in the
Introduction: (a) vmPFC (gyrus rectus, orbital parts of mid frontal
gyrus, and orbital parts of superior frontal gyrus), (b) bilateral
insula (c) bilateral striatum (caudate, putamen), (d) bilateral IPC
(inferior parietal lobe, supramarginal gyrus, angular gyrus). Pick-
Atlas (Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004) was used to create a single
combined mask of the four ROIs deﬁned anatomically using the
Anatomical Automatic Labeling (AAL) Atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002). Statistics within this ROI mask were thresholded at
P < 0.05 with false discovery rate (FDR) correction applied and
an extent threshold of 10 voxels. AAL was used for voxel local-
ization. Rfxplot software (Gläscher, 2009) was used to extract
and display percent signal change or parameter estimates for
peak voxels. To test for other foci outside the ROI mask that
may be sensitive to the choice parameters, we also conducted
exploratory whole-brain analyses at a less stringent level with sta-
tistical inferences performed at a level of P < 0.001 uncorrected
and a minimal cluster size of 10 voxels (see also Van Leijenhorst
et al., 2006; Elliott et al., 2008; Sharot et al., 2009; Plassmann et al.,
2010).
Two supplemental analyses were conducted to provide quality
checking of our task against established effects and to facilitate
comparison with previous work. First, although the goal of this
study was to investigate neural correlates of decision-making (i.e.,
during selection), we compared outcome-related BOLD responses
to wins and losses in a whole-brain analysis in order to validate our
data in relation to the prior literature. The results of this analysis
can be found in the Table A4 in Appendix. Second, a number of
prior neuroimaging studies have assessed the neural representa-
tion of the expected value of choice options (e.g., Tobler et al.,
2009; Symmonds et al., 2010). In order to allow the comparison
of our data with this prior literature, we calculated an additional
GLM:BOLDresponsesweremodeled to the selection andoutcome
events as in the primary GLM, but with expected value [(proba-
bility of winning minus probability of losing) multiplied by bet
amount] entered as a single parametric modulator to the selec-
tion regressors. We then identiﬁed areas that were sensitive to the
expected value during active and passive bet selection, using the
ROI and whole-brain approaches. The results of these analyses can
be found in Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix.
Analysis of the behavioral data revealed considerable individual
differences in betting behavior.Most importantly,participants var-
ied considerably in the degree to which they adjusted their bets to
the chances of winning in active-choice trials (“risk adjustment”).
This tendency can numerically be expressed for each participant
by calculating the change in average bet size in 60 and 70%-trials
compared to in 80%-trials (Studer and Clark, 2011).We assessed
whether this heterogeneity in choice behavior was related to indi-
vidual differences in neural sensitivity during bet selection, and
particularly neural responsiveness to the chances of winning, by
entering risk adjustment as a co-variable in the following three
group-level t -tests: (1) active-choice versus no-choice trials, (2)
parametric modulation by the chances of winning in both choice
conditions, (3) ratio× choice interaction. Whole-brain analysis
(P < 0.001 uncorrected, k = 10) was then conducted to iden-
tify areas where activity correlated with risk adjustment across
participants.
RESULTS
BEHAVIOR
Analysis of behavioral data replicated our previous results on the
same task administered outside the MRI scanner (see Studer and
Clark, 2011 for details). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst examined whether
participants varied their bets in the active-choice condition.A one-
way ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main effect of the likelihood of
winning [F(2, 78)= 47.31, P < 0.001, η2p = 0.55], with bets ris-
ing with increasing likelihood (average chosen bet: trials with 60%
probability of winning: 52± 3 points, 70%-trials: 72± 3 points,
80%-trials: 88± 1 points).
Response times were sensitive to the chances of winning
and the requirement for active choice: a 3 (probability of win-
ning)× 2 (choice) repeated-measures ANOVA on the decision
latencies revealed a signiﬁcant probability× choice interaction
[F(2, 78)= 18.96, P < 0.001, η2p = 0.33], as well as signiﬁ-
cant main effects of probability [F(2, 78)= 50.82, P < 0.001,
η2p = 0.57] and choice [F(1, 39)= 5.21, P < 0.05, η2p = 0.12].
As expected, participants were faster to select their bet on no-
choice trials compared to active-choice trials and deliberated
less when the probability of winning increased, particularly
in active-choice trials (active choice: 60%-trials: 1691 ± 67 ms,
70%-trials: 1517± 64 ms, 80%-trials: 1224± 43 ms, no choice:
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60%-trials: 1433± 73 ms, 70%-trials: 1304± 69 ms, 80%-trials:
1264± 57 ms).
NEURAL CORRELATES OF ACTIVE CHOICE
First,we compared neural activations during the selection phase in
active-choice trials to brain responses during the selection phase
in no-choice trials. The requirement for active choice was associ-
ated with higher responses in the caudate bilaterally (right: peak at
12, 4, 8; t = 6.39; left: peak at −8, 10, 2; t = 5.64), anterior insula
bilaterally (right: peak at 32, 20, 4; t = 5.25; left: peak at −34, 26,
2; t = 4.32), IPC bilaterally (right: peak at 34, −48, 40; t = 4.57;
left: peak at −24, −54, 52; t = 4.15), and in the right OFC (peak at
36 50 −2; t = 3.31), compared to computer-dictated selection (see
Figure 2). There were no foci within the ROI mask that displayed
higher activity during passive selection.
An exploratory whole-brain analysis additionally showed an
increased signal during active compared to passive selection in
a number of areas outside the ROIs, including in the anterior
cingulate cortex (BA32), midbrain, and superior parietal cortex
(see Table A1 in Appendix). Within the IPC, both increased and
decreased activations during active choice of bets compared to pas-
sive selectionwere observed in adjacent subregions.Note,however,
that the ROI analysis only conﬁrmed increased activation in the
IPC during active choice of bets.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF PROBABILITY OF WINNING
Our second aim was to identify brain areas that are sensitive to
the likelihood of winning during the selection phase. We reasoned
that regions that subserve decision-making would predominantly
be sensitive to the probability of winning in active-choice trials,
when this information was used to guide choice.
The ROI analysis revealed such a probability× choice interac-
tion in the mOFC (peak at −6, 26, −12; t = 5.86), angular gyrus
bilaterally (right: peak at 60, −54, 26; t = 5.20; left: peak at −56,
−66, 26; t = 5.76), supramarginal gyrus bilaterally (right: peak at
66,−22, 22; t = 4.08, left: peak at−50,−24, 16; t = 3.26), the ante-
rior insula bilaterally (right: peak at 32, 20,−20; t = 4.23; left: peak
at –28, 16, −8; t = 4.94), and in the right caudate (peak at 10, 10,
−2; t = 4.21; see Figure 3). Whole-brain analysis (see Table A2 in
Appendix) revealed additional responses (outside the ROI mask)
in the medial superior frontal gyrus and the midcingulate cortex.
In a follow-up analysis, we tested whether these activations
remained signiﬁcant after the variance shared with the bet size
modulator was removed from the estimation of the probability
modulator. A second GLM with the order of parametric modula-
tors reversed conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant probability× choice interac-
tion in the mOFC (peak at −4, 26, −12; t = 4.33), angular gyrus
bilaterally (right: peak at 62, −38, 34; t = 3.68; left: peak at −50,
−60, 24; t = 4.09), right supramarginal gyrus (peak at 68, −44,
FIGURE 2 | Active versus passive selection of bets. ROI analysis revealed
stronger activations during active choice of bets compared to
computer-dictated bet selection in the anterior insula bilaterally (peaks at −34,
26, 2; 32, 20, 4), the caudate bilaterally (peaks at −8, 10, 2; 12, 4, 8), and the
inferior parietal lobe (IPL) bilaterally (peaks at −24, −54, 52; 34, −48, 40).
Results are displayed at P <0.05, FDR-corrected. Bar graphs show percent
signal change at peak voxels [(A,B): anterior insula, (C,D): caudate, (E,F): IPL]
during bet selection for the two choice conditions. Error bars represent SEM.
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FIGURE 3 | Neural correlates of chances of winning during bet
selection. ROI analysis revealed that neural responses in the
supramarginal gyrus bilaterally (peaks at −50, −24, 16; 66, −22, 22),
angular gyrus bilaterally (peaks at −56, −66, 26; 60, −54, 26), anterior
insula bilaterally (peaks at −28, 16, −8; 32, 20, −20), and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (peak at −6, 26, −12) are differentially modulated by the
chances of winning during active versus passive bet selection. Results are
displayed at P <0.05, FDR-corrected. Bar graphs show parameter
estimates for the probability of winning modulator in the two choice
conditions at peak voxels [(A,G): supramarginal gyrus, (B,F): angular gyrus,
(C,E): anterior insula, (D): ventromedial prefrontal cortex]. Error bars
represent SEM.
24; t = 3.16), and the anterior insula bilaterally (right: peak at 30,
18, −20 t = 3.52; left: peak at −38, −2, −14; t = 4.82) in the ROI
analysis. The results of the corresponding whole-brain analysis are
described in Table A2 in the Appendix.
We also tested for brain areas that were modulated by the prob-
ability of winning independently of the choice condition. In the
ROI analysis, no regions were signiﬁcantly modulated by the prob-
ability of winning across both choice conditions. Whole-brain
analysis found that neural responses in the left dlPFC, right pos-
terior insula, and visual cortex, as well as in the left angular gyrus
and left supramarginal gyrus, were correlated positively with the
probability of winning in both active-choice and no-choice trials
(see Table A2 in Appendix). A follow-up analysis (whole-brain)
showed that BOLD responses in the left angular gyrus and visual
cortex remained signiﬁcantlymodulated by the probability of win-
ning in the second GLM, after removing variance shared with the
bet size modulator (see Table A2 in Appendix). There were no
areas identiﬁed in which activity was negatively correlated with the
probability of winning (i.e., greater activity with lower likelihoods
of winning) in either analysis.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN GAMBLING-RELATED BRAIN ACTIVITY
Exploratory analyses tested whether heterogeneity in behavioral
performancewas related to individual differences in neural activity
during betting choices. Speciﬁcally, we examined whether behav-
ioral sensitivity to the chances of winning (risk adjustment) was
related to neural sensitivity to the chances of winning across par-
ticipants. Whole-brain analysis showed that risk adjustment was
positively correlated with neural sensitivity to the chances of win-
ning in active-choice and no-choice trials in the left supramarginal
gyrus (peak at −54, −28, 30, t = 4.05), the left cuneus (peak at –
22, −60, 26, t = 4.08), and the right precuneus (peak at 8 −56, 36,
t = 4.41). Thus, participants who adjusted their bets more to the
chances of winning showed stronger responses to higher likelihood
of winning in these brain areas. The reverse contrast did not reveal
any signiﬁcant activations, i.e., areas where neural responsivity
to the chances of winning were negatively correlated with risk
adjustment. No signiﬁcant relationships between risk adjustment
and neural responsivity in the chances of winning× choice con-
trast were found. We additionally tested whether risk adjustment
was correlated with neural responsivity in the overall active-choice
versus no-choice contrast. No signiﬁcant activations were found
in this analysis.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF MAGNITUDE OF BETS
Our design also allowed us to identify areas that were sensi-
tive to the magnitude of the bet placed. Speciﬁcally, due to the
order of the parametric modulators in our design matrix, we
could test for areas where the BOLD signal was modulated by
the bet size, and was not already explained by the probability
modulator. As in the probability analysis, we ﬁrst identiﬁed brain
areas that were more responsive to the magnitude of bets dur-
ing selection in active-choice compared to no-choice trials. In
the ROI analysis, no regions were identiﬁed that showed such a
bet size× choice interaction. An exploratory whole-brain analysis,
however, found this pattern in the supramarginal gyrus bilat-
erally and the right visual cortex (see Table A3 in Appendix;
Figure 4).
We also tested for neural activations that weremodulated by the
size of bets independently of the choice condition. ROI analysis
did not reveal any areas that were signiﬁcantly modulated by the
bet size. However, in the whole-brain analysis, we observed that
vmPFC (BA10) and two clusters in left and right caudate were pos-
itively correlated with bet size across both choice conditions (see
Figure 4 and Table A3 in Appendix). The peak of the vmPFC clus-
ter was just on the border of our ROI,with about half of the cluster
located superior to the ROI. The caudate clusters were located in
close proximity to, but fully outside, the striatal ROI. No areas in
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FIGURE 4 | Neural correlates of bet size during selection. Neural
responses in the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex (peak at 12, 60, −6)
and caudate (peak at 6, 2, −2) were correlated with the size of bets
during both active and passive bet selection. Furthermore, a bet
size× choice condition interaction was observed in the right
supramarginal gyrus (peak at 70, −28, 34). Results are displayed at
P <0.001, uncorrected. Bar graphs show parameter estimates for the
bet size modulator in the two choice conditions at peak voxels (A):
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, (B): caudate, (C): supramarginal gyrus].
Error bars represent SEM.
which responses were negatively correlated with the size of bets
were found.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the neural basis of betting choices
in healthy subjects using fMRI. We analyzed BOLD responses
during the selection phase of the Roulette Betting Task and manip-
ulated choice requirements and the odds of winning. Our ﬁrst
aim was to compare brain responses during volitional (i.e., active,
instrumental) versus computer-dictated (passive) bet selection.
Active choice of bets was accompanied by increased activity in the
striatum, midbrain, medial orbitofrontal cortex, anterior insula,
anterior cingulate cortex, visual, and (pre-)motor areas, compared
to computer-dictated selection of bets. Our second aim was to
assess how the likelihood of winning is neurally represented dur-
ing active and passive bet selection. ROI analysis showed that
the anterior insula bilaterally, IPC bilaterally, right caudate, and
vmPFC were particularly sensitive to the chances of winning in
active-choice trial, that is to say when this information was used
to guide selection. Whole-brain analysis found that the left IPC
and right insula correlated with the probability of winning across
both active and passive conditions. Individual differences in risk
adjustment were positively correlated with neural sensitivity to the
chances of winning in the left IPC, across participants.
NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF ACTIVE CHOICE
Our results highlight the impact of volitional choice upon
brain activity during laboratory gambling. Key structures of the
brain reward system – speciﬁcally the striatum, midbrain, and
vmPFC – were more strongly activated during active choice of
bets compared to computer-dictated bet selection. We previously
showed that psychophysiological arousal is enhanced during active
compared to passive bet selection on the same task (Studer and
Clark, 2011). In naturalistic gambling, players are more likely to
bet and to accept higher risks under conditions of active choice
(e.g., selecting lottery numbers) compared to no-choice condi-
tions (“lucky dip”), even in games of pure chance where these
manipulations do not affect the likelihood of winning (Henslin,
1967; Langer, 1975; Ladouceur and Mayrand, 1987; Davis et al.,
2000). In the brain, instrumental action has previously been found
to modulate feedback-related neural activity in the midbrain and
striatum (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004; Zink
et al., 2004; Walton et al., 2007) and active choice of risky gambles
has been observed to enhance striatal responses to the presentation
of outcomes (Coricelli et al., 2005; Rao et al., 2008; Camille et al.,
2011). Our results extend this work by showing that neural activity
in the midbrain and striatum is also boosted by active choice at the
point of selection, that is to say, during the actual decision period.
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was also more activated
during active compared with computer-dictated bet selection. A
considerable bodyof research innon-humanprimates has revealed
that the ACC plays a critical role in active, volitional action
selection and instrumental responding (see Walton et al., 2007;
Rushworth, 2008; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008 for reviews). Fur-
thermore, previous neuroimaging studies in humans reported that
the ACC is activated during volitional action selection in learning
environments (e.g., Walton et al., 2004; Behrens et al., 2007). For
instance, Walton et al. (2004) assessed neural responses during
performance of a higher-order switching task, in which partic-
ipants received a switch cue and were either instructed which
new response rule to follow, or could choose freely. The authors
found stronger activations in theACCduring active, self-generated
www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 46 | 7
Studer et al. Neural correlates of gambling choices
rule selection compared to instructed selection. Our results extend
these previous ﬁndings by showing that the human ACC is also
implicated in the volitional choice of (explicitly presented) risky
gambles.
NEURAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING DURING
BET SELECTION
The second aim was to identify brain areas that are sensitive to the
chances of winning during bet selection, and to test for qualitative
and quantitative differences in odds sensitivity under active and
passive choice conditions. Neural responses in the IPC (angular
and supramarginal gyrus) reﬂected the chances of winning during
the selection phase, and more so in the active-choice condition.
Neuroimaging studies on decision-making under risk frequently
report activations in the IPC (see Krain et al., 2006; Platt and Huet-
tel, 2008 for reviews), but many studies have failed to consider the
functional signiﬁcance of these activations, often making reverse
inferences concerninghypothetical attentional demands. Thus, the
role of the IPC in human decision-making has remained poorly
speciﬁed.A few authors have speculated that the IPCmight process
the probabilities of outcomes during decision-making under risk
(see Ernst et al., 2004; Labudda et al., 2008), in line with the well-
established role of this region in numerical cognition (for recent
reviews, see Ansari, 2008; Sandrini and Rusconi, 2009; Arsalidou
and Taylor, 2011). Our results provide correlative evidence for this
hypothesis, by showing that neural activity during bet selection in
the IPC was modulated by the probability of winning: responses
were greater on trials with more favorable odds. Our ﬁndings
also converge with electrophysiological evidence in non-human
primates, which shows that neurons in the posterior parietal cor-
tex represent the probability of rewards during free and forced
choice of options with uncertain outcomes (Platt and Glimcher,
1999; McCoy and Platt, 2005; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Louie
and Glimcher, 2010), and reﬂect choice certainty during percep-
tual decision-making (Shadlen et al., 1996; Shadlen and Newsome,
2001; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). Moreover, we found that the IPC
was particularly sensitive to the chances of winning in the active-
choice condition, i.e., in situations where this information is used
to guide risky choice. In close parallel to our results, Mohr et al.
(2010) recently argued that the IPC is involved in risk processing
during the decision window, but not during outcome anticipation,
basedon ameta-analysis of prior fMRI studies ondecision-making
under explicit risk. Finally, we observed that neural sensitivity to
the chances of winning within the left supramarginal gyrus was
stronger for individuals that adjusted their bets more to the likeli-
hood of winning, i.e., showed a stronger behavioral sensitivity to
the chances of winning. Together, these results indicate that the
IPC subserves decision-making under explicit risk, and imply that
currentmodels of human choice based primarily on fronto-striatal
circuitry (e.g., Brand et al., 2006; Frank and Claus, 2006) may be
inadequate.
It is noteworthy that the IPC has recently also been imple-
mented in other types of decision-making that do not include
uncertain outcomes. Speciﬁcally, recent electrophysiological and
neuroimaging studies reported that neural responses in the
IPC reﬂect the amount of evidence accumulated for a deci-
sion and decision conﬁdence in cost–beneﬁt and perceptual
decision-making (e.g.,Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Basten et al., 2010;
Kayser et al., 2010). Our results are broadly consistent with these
data, as one might speculate that decision conﬁdence increased
with the chances of winning on our task.
The IPC has also been implicated in the planning and execu-
tion of eye movements (for reviews, see, e.g., Andersen et al., 1992;
Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 1995, 2004; Grosbras et al., 2005). Could
it be that the identiﬁed parietal activations reﬂect eye movements
in order to gather information about the chances of winning rather
than the processing of this information per se? While we have
not explicitly controlled for potential eye movements in the data
analysis, we think this is unlikely. If the inferior parietal activation
reﬂected eye movements, one would expect stronger responses in
trialswith lower chances of winning, inwhich thewheels contained
a more balanced number of winning and losing segments. How-
ever, we observed the opposite pattern: activations in the IPC were
positively correlated with the chances of winning. In other words,
responses in the IPC were strongest in the 80%-trials, which con-
tained only two losing segments. There is ample evidence that in
the range of 1–4 visual objects, numerosity is assessed in an auto-
matic and fast visual process known as “subitizing” (see Feigenson
et al., 2004 for a review). Thus,we posit that the chances of winning
in the 80%-trials can easily be assessed at the ﬁrst glance.
Neural responses during bet selection in the anterior insula
were also characterized by an interaction between the probabil-
ity of winning and the choice condition. Similar to the present
results, Clark et al. (2008) found abnormal betting behavior in
patients with damage to the insular cortex on the CGT: individu-
als with insula lesions failed to adjust their bets to the chances
of winning. Our ﬁnding that neural responses in the anterior
insula reﬂect the chances of winning× choice condition inter-
action is also consistent with a study by Rao et al. (2008), who
observed differential activations in the anterior insula during vol-
untary versus involuntary risk-taking on the Balloon Analog Risk
Task. The direction of the relationship between neural responses
in the anterior insula and the probability of winning differed
between active-choice and no-choice trials. During passive bet
selection, neural responses in the anterior insula were negatively
correlated with the chances of winning, while there was a pos-
itive correlation between the probability of winning and insula
activity during active choice of bets (see Figure 3). Prior neu-
roimaging studies by Preuschoff et al. (2006, 2008) showed that
the anterior insula is sensitive to reward variance during the antic-
ipation of outcomes. In our task, participants tended to select
higher bets, and thus took higher risks, when there was a greater
probability of winning. Thus, it could be speculated that the ante-
rior insula is sensitive to (subjective) risk during bet selection
(see also Bossaerts, 2010). We further observed different activa-
tion patterns in the left and right anterior insula. The left ante-
rior insula was primarily modulated by the chances of winning
during passive bet selection, while the right anterior insula activa-
tion reﬂected the chances of winning during both volitional and
computer-dictated bet selection. In line with these ﬁndings, the
meta-analysis by Mohr et al. (2010) suggested the right anterior
insula to be involved in risk processing during the choice window,
whereas the left anterior insula processes outcome uncertainty
during anticipation.
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Finally, a probability of winning × choice condition interac-
tion was also found in the vmPFC and the right caudate. These
two regions were additionally sensitive to the size of bets, inde-
pendent of the choice condition, although it should be noted that
the cluster peaks fell outside of our a priori ROI. Prior neuroimag-
ing work has implicated the vmPFC in the subjective valuation of
choice options (e.g., Chib et al., 2009; Peters and Büchel, 2009,
2010; Hare et al., 2010; Sescousse et al., 2010). Neuropsycho-
logical studies showed that injury to the vmPFC is associated
with enhanced risk-taking in everyday life (Eslinger and Dama-
sio, 1985; Shallice and Burgess, 1991; Satish et al., 1999) and poor
performance on laboratory gambling tasks (e.g., Bechara et al.,
1999; Bechara et al., 2000; Fellows and Farah, 2005, 2007; Weller
et al., 2007). Speciﬁcally, we previously found that patients with
vmPFC-lesions selected higher bets than healthy participants and
brain damaged controls on the CGT (Clark et al., 2003, 2008).
Another study found impaired probability judgment on the CGT
in patients with vmPFC-damage (Rogers et al., 1999). Similarly,
neural responses in the ventral striatum have previously been
found to reﬂect the expected value (i.e., the combination of reward
magnitude and occurrence probability) of anticipated uncertain
outcomes (e.g., Knutson et al., 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Yacu-
bian et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007).Herewe found that the vmPFC
and ventral striatum reﬂected both the probability and the magni-
tude of potential wins during risky selection, suggesting that these
areas might hold a coordinated representation of these two deci-
sion parameters. Indeed, an additional analysis of our data (see
Table A5 in Appendix) showed that vmPFC and ventral striatum
were sensitive to the expected value of active and passive gambling
choices.
CONCLUSION
Our results highlight the impact of active choice upon the neural
correlates of gambling: a distributed network of brain regions was
more activated during volitional compared to computer-dictated
bet selection, including key areas of the brain reward system,
namely the midbrain, striatum, and vmPFC. In line with previous
neuropsychological data, we found that the vmPFC and anterior
insula are involved in betting choices. Our data also provide cor-
relative evidence for a role of the IPC in human decision-making
under risk linked to the processing of outcome probabilities.
Neural responses during the selectionphase in the IPC reﬂected the
probability of winning, especially so in the active-choice condition.
In other words, the IPC was particularly implicated in situations
where the processing of probability information was required to
guide bet selection. Our data converge with recent ﬁndings of elec-
trophysiological research in non-human primates and suggest that
current models of human decision-making under risk focused on
fronto-striatal circuitry should be extended to include interactions
with the IPC.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Neural correlates of active compared to passive selection of bets identified in the exploratory whole-brain analysis (P <0.001, k =10).
Brain region (label at cluster peak) Cluster size (in voxels) Hemisphere MNI peak coordinates T -values
X Y Z
INCREASEDACTIVATIONS DURINGACTIVE CHOICE OF BETS
Anterior cingulate cortex 13070 Left −6 34 22 7.57
Right 10 28 14 6.43
Other included structures: midbrain, right anterior insula, bilateral striatum, inferior
frontal gryus, cerebellum, thalamus, midcingulum, and others
Anterior insula 204 Left −32 30 2 4.50
Other included structures: inferior frontal gyrus
Inferior parietal lobule 544 Right 34 −48 40 4.57
Other included structures: angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, superior parietal lobule
Superior parietal lobule 663 Left −20 −56 46 5.13
Other included structures: left middle occipital gyrus, inferior parietal lobule
Superior frontal gyrus 302 Right 22 −6 52 4.66
Other included structures: precentral gryus, middle frontal gryus
Middle frontal gyrus 150 Right 40 53 8 4.63
Middle occipital gyrus 2260 Left −20 −96 2 6.33
Other included structures: left inferior occipital gyrus
2809 Right 26 −80 0 7.53
Other included structures: right inferior and superior occipital gyri
Vermis 164 0 −56 −34 4.90
Hippocampus 104 Left −42 −44 −6 4.65
Precentral gyrus 131 Left −42 −4 26 4.51
42 Left −34 −4 52 3.72
INCREASEDACTIVATIONS DURING PASSIVE SELECTION OF BETS
Supramarginal gyrus 412 Left −62 −44 40 5.16
Other included structures: left inferior parietal lobe
110 Right 66 −44 34 4.37
Lingual gyrus 192 Left −8 −76 −8 5.03
Middle temporal gyrus 798 Right 54 −70 34 5.02
Other included structures: right angular gyrus
84 Left −44 −64 20 4.15
28 Left −60 −54 −4 3.72
Cuneus 124 Right 6 −84 30 3.99
Angular gyrus 10 Left −56 −66 30 3.52
Rolandic operculum 16 Left −56 2 12 3.52
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Table A2 | Neural correlates of probability of winning during bet selection (whole-brain analysis, P <0.001, k =10).
Brain region (label at cluster peak) Cluster size (in voxels) Hemisphere MNI peak coordinates T -values
X Y Z
ACTIVATIONS DISPLAYINGA PROBABILITY OFWINNING×CHOICE INTERACTION
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex* 1473 Bilateral −4 28 −8 6.72
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 815 Left −52 2 −28 5.69
Other included structures: left anterior insula, temporal pole, inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part)*
50 Left −38 30 −8 4.25
Angular gyrus* 315 Right 62 −56 32 5.28
Other included structures: right middle* and superior temporal gyrus*
Middle temporal gyrus* 717 Left −56 −66 26 5.76
Other included structures: left angular gyrus*
23 Left −66 −36 −2 4.04
25 Left −64 −24 −12 3.96
35 Right 60 −4 22 4.19
Lingual gyrus* 466 Left −28 −56 0 5.12
Other included structures: left cerebellum*
529 Right 20 −74 2 4.98
Other included structures: right calcarine gyrus
105 Right 12 −30 −6 4.35
Anterior insula* 85 Right 38 20 −22 4.58
Supramarginal gyrus 40 Right 66 −22 22 4.08
Caudate 15 Left −10 4 18 3.72
20 Left −8 14 2 3.71
88 Right 10 6 −2 4.28
Midcingulate cortex* 300 Left −8 −12 42 4.47
Other included structures: right midcingulate cortex, left SMA*
Medial superior frontal gryus* 70 Left −6 52 36 3.82
20 Left −10 38 52 3.73
10 Right 10 56 36 3.83
79 Right 16 36 48 4.20
Vermis 27 0 −60 −38 4.48
Thalamus 35 Left −2 −10 2 4.29
Superior temporal gyrus 27 Left −40 −8 −10 3.94
Supplementary motor area* 12 Left −10 −10 72 3.74
Cerebellum* 19 Right 32 −70 −34 4.02
55 Right 24 −48 −26 3.75
Hippocampus* 16 Left −20 −20 −8 3.68
ACTIVATIONS REFLECTINGTHE PROBABILITY OFWINNING IN BOTH CHOICE CONDITIONS
Calcarine gyrus* 4950 Bilateral 0 −58 12 4.48
Other included structures: bilateral lingual gyrus, bilateral cuneus
Angular gyrus* 543 Left −38 −74 36 3.92
Other included structures: left middle occipital gyrus*
Supramarginal gyrus 16 Left −44 −28 30 3.93
70 Right 38 −28 28 4.35
Middle frontal gyrus 60 Left −24 24 54 3.76
Paracentral lobule 28 Right 4 −20 72 4.23
Continued
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Table A2 | Continued
Brain region (label at cluster peak) Cluster size (in voxels) Hemisphere MNI peak coordinates T -values
X Y Z
Middle temporal gyrus* 67 Left −60 −50 −8 4.01
Cerebellum 42 Right 22 −50 −30 4.00
22 Right 20 −80 −26 3.60
Fusiform gyrus 27 Left −24 −32 −18 3.39
Midcingulate cortex 28 Left −4 −42 42 3.70
*Activations that were also found in the same contrasts calculated in GLM2, in which the order of parametric modulators was reversed [(1) bet size, (2) probability of
winning]. Thus, these areas represented the probability of winning independently of the bet size.
Table A3 | Neural correlates of bet size during selection (whole-brain analysis, P <0.001, k =10).
Brain region (label at cluster peak) Cluster size (in voxels) Hemisphere MNI peak coordinates T -values
X Y Z
ACTIVATIONS DISPLAYINGA BET SIZE×CHOICE INTERACTION
Supramarginal gyrus 13 Left −66 −30 34 3.72
185 Right 70 −28 34 4.70
Lingual gyrus 139 Right 12 −74 0 4.54
ACTIVATIONS REFLECTINGTHE BET SIZE IN BOTH CHOICE CONDITIONS
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 30 Right 12 60 −6 4.36
Caudate 27 Right 6 2 −2 4.16
30 Left −22 −2 18 3.98
Lingual gyrus 230 Right 12 −78 −2 4.37
Precuneus 48 Right 20 −56 36 4.36
Middle occipital gyrus 25 Left −26 −58 28 4.01
11 Left −52 −76 18 3.68
Thalamus 11 Left −4 −4 2 3.93
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Table A4 | Neural correlates during feedback (whole-brain analysis, FWE-corrected, P <0.05, k =10).
Brain region (label at cluster peak) Cluster size (in voxels) Hemisphere MNI peak coordinates T -values
X Y Z
WIN>LOSS
Caudate 1995 Left −12 8 −6 8.73
Right 10 4 −8 7.82
Other included structures: bilateral putamen, bilateral pallidum
200 Left −22 4 22 7.58
Medial orbitofrontal cortex 399 Bilateral −6 44 −8 8.09
Other included structures: left anterior cingulate cortex
Postcentral gyrus 283 Right 24 −34 44 8.22
Anterior insula 150 Left −26 −24 24 8.21
Superior frontal gryus 105 Left −22 38 46 8.19
Middle occipital gyrus 142 Left −32 −64 16 7.12
Precuneus 415 Left −6 −58 18 7.11
Other included structures: right precuneus
Midcingulum 51 Left −18 −26 36 6.76
Lingual gyrus 67 Right 22 −76 0 6.39
Precentral gyrus 29 Left −22 −16 52 6.06
Superior occipital gyrus 25 Right 20 −88 22 5.79
LOSS>WIN
No signiﬁcant activations found
Table A5 | Neural correlates of expected value during selection (GLM3, ROI analysis, P <0.001, FDR-corrected, k =10).
Brain region (label at cluster peak) Cluster size (in voxels) Hemisphere MNI peak coordinates T -values
X Y Z
ACTIVATIONS DISPLAYINGAN EXPECTEDVALUE×CHOICE INTERACTION
No signiﬁcant activations found
ACTIVATIONS REFLECTING EXPECTEDVALUE IN BOTH CHOICE CONDITIONS
Medial orbitofrontal gyrus 670 Bilateral 2 56 −12 4.67
Angular gyrus 673 Left −54 −64 26 4.29
Other included structures: left supramarginal gyrus
Caudate 23 Right 8 6 −2 3.46
Putamen 11 Left −22 −2 14 3.43
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Table A6 | Neural correlates of expected value during selection (GLM3, whole-brain analysis, P <0.001, k =10).
Brain region (label at cluster peak) Cluster size (in voxels) Hemisphere MNI peak coordinates T -values
X Y Z
ACTIVATIONS DISPLAYINGAN EXPECTEDVALUE×CHOICE INTERACTION
Precentral gyrus 15 Left −40 −26 64 3.95
Lingual gyrus 71 Right 12 −78 −4 3.82
ACTIVATIONS REFLECTING EXPECTEDVALUE IN BOTH CHOICE CONDITIONS
Cerebellum 2978 Right 22 −64 −26 6.12
18 Right 18 −38 −30 3.78
285 Left −20 −72 −30 4.34
Medial superior frontal gyrus 914 Bilateral −4 46 40 5.52
Medial orbitofrontal cortex 321 Bilateral 2 56 −12 4.67
Precuneus 93 Right 22 −52 30 4.86
Angular gyrus 251 Left −54 −64 26 4.29
Other included structures: left supramarginal gyrus
Middle temporal gyrus 27 Left −58 −32 −12 4.36
Pallidum 77 Left −8 −2 0 4.10
Other included structures: right caudate
Anterior cingulum 130 Left −10 38 4 4.32
67 Right 8 34 −2 3.77
Caudate 68 Left −26 −10 22 4.29
Inferior frontal gryus 21 Right 28 6 26 4.29
Calcarine gyrus 64 Left −4 −94 12 3.77
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